In the context of the fairly recent Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC), I examine phenomenologically the nature of truth as the essential condition for overcoming social and political conflicts, and as an instrument for enforcing so-called “transitional justice” periods and promoting reconciliation. I also briefly approach the limits of this truth’s possibility of being recognized, if its evaluative and practical dimensions and its appeal to an “intelligence of emotions” do not prevail over its merely theoretical claims. Though not expounding Schutz’s (...) and Husserl’s contributions, and meditating on phenomena they did not deal with, I carry out this reflection inspired by their work and methodological approach. The case study used as an intuitive illustration is the recent Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. (shrink)

Husserl envisages transcendental phenomenology as a radically founding science that lays bare the higher-order experiences whereby logic and a theory of science become constituted. On the other hand, according to a usual presentation of Hegel’s philosophy, phenomenology is “logic’s precondition,” and science presents itself as its “result.” This alleged precedence of Hegel’s phenomenology (with its experiential and historical horizons) regarding logic may be a motif behind the current affinities recently traced between Hegelian and Husserlian notions of phenomenology that highlight their (...) views on experience, history, and the lifeworld. This paper offers instead a reconsideration of aspects of their philosophies mostly challenged or dismissed since the rise of positivism: a reappraisal of their views on the relationship between phenomenology, logic, and philosophy as an “absolute” system of sciences. The argument is made that the irreconcilable difference between their projects ultimately stands on the radical contrast between Hegel’s speculative-conceptual method and system of sciences and Husserl’s foundational science and method as experiential-phenomenological all the way through. Despite this methodological abyss, this paper vindicates their affinities in their refusal to segregate science from life, and their attempts to overcome modernity’s inherited fragmentation of culture by providing an all-unifying approach to philosophy. (shrink)

Este trabajo intenta iluminar desde un punto de vista fenomenológico las crisis ecológicas que han afectado a nuestro planeta y al mundo circundante de la vida en el siglo veintiuno, y en particular, la devastadora pandemia global que se desató el año 2020. Primero abordo ciertos aspectos histórico-críticos que preceden a la pandemia del 2020, y que se relacionan a la visión mecanicista moderna en las ciencias y la cultura. Luego, situada en la actitud natural, parto de esta ecocrisis actual (...) como un “hilo conductor” para la interrogación retrospectiva que conduce a las raíces experienciales de todo sentido y validez objetiva, asumiendo la perspectiva de la primera persona y contratastándola con aspectos de una nueva y unificada visión sistémica de la vida. A continuación, destacando la paradoja del sujeto-en-el-mundo y el sujeto-para-el-mundo, examino la estructura del mundo de la vida como un camino o vía hacia el campo de la experiencia trascendental—aquel de la correlación entre la vida humana (encarnada, intersubjetiva e histórico-temoral) y el mundo, es decir, la estructura noético-noemática, con el objeto de mostrar cómo no es reductible a una auto-afección pasiva, sino que es la fuente originaria de una virtud espiritual y capacidad transformativa: la de la responsabilidad. (shrink)

This chapter offered in hommage to Jacques Taminiaux’s long and fruitful career reflecting on ontological, political, and aesthetic issues, starts following the lead of his reading of Heidegger’s interpretation of these issues, as following the same “Platonic filiation” as in most of German Idealism’s representatives. Namely, Heidegger seems to interpret praxis beyond all relation to interaction and interlocution, but also that his revaluation of the role of art in politics is because he confers the utmost importance upon poiêsis as an (...) “internal potency in the human understanding of Being, of the Lichtblick,” namely, as a “high-ranked theôria.” It primarily addresses the question of how theôria-Sophia, praxis-phronêsis, poiêsis-technê in their relatedness and oppositions, are connected with the “ethical” (practical) dimension of transcendental reduction, following some hints from Taminiaux’s (2004) reflections on Heidegger’s “metamorphosis” of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction (both eidetic and transcendental), as having proved that “reduction was at the core of Husserl’s theoretical project.” However, Taminiaux thinks that “it is not an exaggeration to claim that the contrast” he has just sketched “entails as many difficulties as those implicit in Husserl’s concept of reduction” (Taminiaux 2004, 44). Thus, the primal motivation for this text’s proposal stems from its interest in finding out whether this appealing and well-argued reading of the Greek and Platonic connivance between theôria-poiêsis in contrast to the fragility and contingency of human practical judgments and the human intrigue of our worldly abode—a reading retrieved by modern and contemporary German philosophers, including Heidegger—is in seamless accordance with the canonical contemporary interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and reduction. Or whether an alternative reading could be risked. What has characterized the success of Taminiaux’s original and piercingly acute reading of the history of philosophy is his close and severe scrutiny of texts transmitted by the tradition in dialogue with our experience of the “matters themselves.” Hence, in the wake of this essential and everlasting teaching, this text risks an alternative reading of the phenomenological reduction, specifically of its transcendental version, as an eminently practical—namely, ethical—achievement (Leistung), driven by a practical virtue, responsibility. (shrink)

Los análisis husserlianos estáticos y genéticos de ciertos temas son primero tomados como hilos conductores para una aproximación generativa del concepto husserliano de ciencia. La justificación de la comprensión de las tres aproximaciones como esencialmente entrelazadas y correlativas, se inspira en las expresiones de la Crisis de Husserl—“nos hallamos en una suerte de círculo, y no hay otra elección que la de avanzar y retroceder en zigzag.” La aproximación estática a la reducción fenomenológica hacia las estructuras, funciones y modo de (...) la vida subjetiva es regresiva (deconstructiva); mientras que las aproximaciones genética y generativa reconstruyen las vías progresivas de las constituciones de sentido y validez, individuales y colectivas (i.e., históricas). Finalmente, se aborda el papel de las emociones en la constitución de los “valores epistémicos”—y los “sesgos cognitivos”—debido al entrelazamiento de las esferas cognitivas, emotivas y volitivas de la vida consciente y sus estratos y funciones preconscientes. (shrink)

The intentionality is a key concept in Husserl’s phenomenology, by means of which comes out to the light the proverbial tension between the modern tradition and the ‘thing self’. Conscious of the risk of reexaminating a topic that it has already been object of innumerables interpretations, the au..

Reseña de Cristóbal Balbontín. Levinas o la posibilidad de un republicanismo libertario. Berlin: Peter Lang, 2021, 208pp.

El papel de filosofía y humanidades en forjar un “ideal de humanidad” se refiere no sólo a las difíciles relaciones que éstas tradicionalmente han tenido con los poderes mundanos, sino, sobre todo, a su papel protagónico como guías de un ideal de humanidad y valores espirituales en tiempos de crisis. Kant defendió el papel de los ideales racionales de la “facultad de filosofía” a fines del s. XVIII, ante la teología, el derecho y la medicina. La reflexión de Fichte cuando (...) la nación alemana luchaba por su existencia luego de su derrota por los ejércitos napoleónicos a inicios del s. XIX, da un impulso decisivo a los valores del idealismo alemán. Un siglo después, ante la misma nación alemana, nuevamente derrotada en la primera guerra mundial y sin hallar respuestas a su aflicción en las ciencias exactas ni en su cultura determinada por la técnica, Husserl ve en “el ideal de Humanidad de Fichte” la respuesta a aquello que puede darle su ultima satisfacción: la producción teleológica de un mundo humano, en el que pueda realizarse un orden mundial moral, único fin, fundamento y valor absoluto de la humanidad. Hoy nos hallamos en otro momento de peligro: no sólo el del positivismo naturalista desplazando desde el s. XIX a la formación humanística. El mayor de los peligros es ahora la alianza de ese naturalismo con el mundo globalizado del presente, bajo el imperio de la estan-darización burocrática y corporativa al servicio de la producción desenfrenada de dinero.The role of philosophy and the human sciences in forging an “ideal of humanity” concerns not only the tensions that they traditionally have had with worldly powers. It mostly deals with their primal role as guides of an ideal of humanity and spiritual values in times of crisis. Kant defended the central role of the “Faculty of Philosophy”’s rational ideals by the end of the 18th century, as opposed to Theology, Jurisprudence and Medicine. Fichte’s reflection when the German nation was fighting for its survival after its defeat by the Napoleonic armies at the beginning of the 19th century, gives a decisive impulse to the values brandished by German Idealism. A century later, facing the same German nation newly defeated at World War I, and without any answers to its affliction either in exact sciences nor in its culture determined by technology, Husserl finds in “Fichte’s Ideal of Humanity“ the answer to that which can give it its lasting satisfaction: the teleological production of a human world, in which a world moral order may arise, as humanity’s sole goal, foundation, and absolute value. Today we find ourselves in another moment of danger: not only that of a naturalistic positivism displacing a humanistic education. The greatest of all dangers is currently the alliance of this naturalism with the Golden calf installed in the globalized world of today, under the empire of the bureaucratic and corporative standardization at the service of the frenzied production of money. (shrink)

En esta contribución propongo una aproximación fenomenológica a la naturaleza de la verdad en el contexto de las recientes Comisiones de la Verdad y la Reconciliación, como la conditio sine qua non de la transición entre situaciones de conflicto social y político y de reconciliación, y por ende como un presupuesto esencial e instrumento concomitante para la aplicación de los denominados períodos de "justicia transicional" recomendados por estas comisiones. También me aproximo brevemente a los límites de la posibilidad que esta (...) verdad sea reconocida si sus dimensiones valorativas y prácticas, así como su llamado a una "inteligencia de las emociones" no prevalece sobre sus demandas meramente teóricas.In this paper I propose a phenomenological approach to the nature of truth inthe context of the recent Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, as the conditio sine qua non for the transition between situations of social and political conflict to those of reconciliation, and thus both as an essential presupposition and concomitant instrument for the enforcement of the so-called "transitional justice" periods that these commissions recommend. I also briefly approach the limits of this truth's possibility of being recognized, if its evaluative and practical dimensions and their appeal to an "intelligence of emotions" do not prevail over its merely theoretical claims. (shrink)

Frecuentemente se ha señalado a la fenomenología de Husserl como una "filosofía de la fundación última y radical auto-responsabilidad." Aquí, sin embargo, examinaremos qué sentido puede tener hablar de "fundación última" y "auto-responsabilidad radical" en filosofía. La "idea de la filosofía" que propone Husserl como una "ciencia universal y rigurosa" de "fundación última" ha sido malinterpretada por sus críticos contemporáneos, que no han prestado atención a su aclaración que esta idea "ha de ser realizada sólo mediante valideces relativas y temporales (...) en un proceso histórico infinito", ni tampoco al hecho que él ya ha replanteado la noción moderna de razón. Que la filosofía ha de proveer una fundación última a toda efectuación de la razón, así como su propia justificación sólo significa que es últimamente responsable de todo sentido y validez en general, así como de sí misma. Empero, el ego consciente activo, con sus efectuaciones racionales –cognitivas, volitivas y emotivas– como el "fundamento absoluto de todas mis validaciones", es precedido por un estrato más profundo, pre-consciente, irracional y pasivo de tendencias emotivas y desiderativas, impulsos e instintos hacia la conciencia y la racionalidad. Así, todo "evidenciar" y Geltungsfundierung se ve finalmente absorbido en una Genesisfundierung. En última instancia, ninguna "evidencia" racional puede ser "adecuada", sino que es esencialmente abierta e inadecuada. La tan criticada "conciencia absoluta" de Husserl está en efecto enraizada en un "absoluto más definitivo y verdadero", a saber, la identidad y diferencia del presente viviente estático-fluyente que pertenece a un ser finito, temporal, perspectivista, encarnado e intersubjetivo. La defensa de la razón y del "discurso fundacional" es para Husserl una cuestión de la "supervivencia de la humanidad" y su preservación de la barbarie. Pero no es una "adquisición permanente" sino la responsabilidad de una "tarea infinita". Así, la filosofía es una "ciencia todo-abarcadora fundada en un fundamento absoluto [...] aunque por cierto bajo la forma de un programa sin fin".Husserl’s phenomenology has been frequently referred to as a “philosophy of ultimate foundation and radical self-responsibility.” Yet here we will examine philosophy’s notion of “ultimate foundation” as “radical self-responsibility.” The “idea of philosophy” that Husserl proposes as a “universal and rigorous science” of “ultimate foundation” has been grossly misinterpreted by his contemporary critics, who have not paid heed to his clarifica-tion that this idea is “to be realized only by way of relative and temporary validities and in an infinite historical process,” nor to the fact that he has already recasted the traditional Modern notion of reason. That philosophy is called upon to provide an ultimate foundation to every accomplishment of reason, as well as its own justification, means that it is ultimately responsible for every sense and validity in general, and for itself. However, the active conscious ego, with its rational –cognitive, volitional and emotional– accomplishments, as the “absolute foundation of all my validations,” is preceded by a deeper, pre-conscious, irrational, and passive stratum of emotional and desiderative tendencies, impulses, instincts and strivings towards consciousness and rationality. Thus every “evidencing” and Geltungsfundierung is finally absorbed within Genesisfundierung. Ultimately no rational “evidence” can ever be “adequate,” but is essentially openended, and inadequate. Husserl’s much criticized “absolute consciousness” is in fact an “absolute” rooted in a “more definite and true absolute,” namely, the identity and difference of the static-fluent living present belonging to a finite, temporal, perspectivist, incarnate and intersubjective being. The defense of reason and of “foundational discourse” is for Husserl a question of “humanity’s survival” and its preservation from barbarity. Yet it is not a “permanent acquisition” but the responsibility of an “infinite task.” Thus philosophy is an “all-embracing science grounded on an absolute foundation [...] though of course in the form of an endless program.". (shrink)

La siguiente reflexión interroga en qué sentido puede todavía hacerse valer hoy la distinción entre ciencias naturales y ciencias de la cultura reconsiderando dicha distinción en el marco de la fenomenología husserliana. Se indaga si ella refleja un “hiato en la cultura” irreversible e infranqueable —heredado del dualismo cartesiano, la crítica kantiana, el positivismo naturalista y la reivindicación neokantiana de las ciencias del espíritu— o si más bien no puede concebirse un suelo común como fuente última de su sentido y (...) validez. Se constata que sólo podrá descubrirse dicho suelo común trascendiendo toda toma de posición ontológica, e interrogando las fuentes trascendentales de la experiencia humana. Dicha interrogación revelará, a su vez, consecuencias inesperadas respecto del carácter finito y limitado de toda empresa humana.The following contribution reflects upon the sense that the distinction between natural and cultural sciences may still have nowadays, reconsidering it within the framework of Husserl’s phenomenology. It questions whether it reflects an irreversible and insurmountable “hiatus in culture” —inherited from Cartesian dualism, Kantian critique, Comte’s naturalism and the neo-Kantian vindication of the cultural sciences— or whether a common soil as their ultimate source of sense and validity may not be conceived instead. It purports that, the said common ground, may only be discovered by transcending every ontological statement, and by questioning the transcendental sources of human experience. This interrogation itself reveals unexpected consequences regarding the finite and limited character of every human endeavour. (shrink)

Les livres qui proposent, en littérature, des lectures phénoménologiques et, en phénoménologie, des lectures littéraires, comme ceux qui, plus généralement en philosophie, engagent des phénoménologies de la littérature ou de l'œuvre littéraire sont aussi nombreux que ceux qui interrogent la phénoménologie et la littérature, ou la littérature et la phénoménologie. Ce volume, unique en son genre, a pris une option très spécifique, qui est une sorte de perspectivisme : interroger la position d'entre-deux du phénoménologue et, à travers lui en sa (...) fonction de 'décrivant', la posture de la phénoménologie entre - voire à l'intersection de - la philosophie et la littérature. À cette dimension concernant la matière et la méthode de la démarche, il s'en ajoute toutefois une autre : ce livre est le fruit d'une collaboration internationale, entre des phénoménologues belges, français et péruviens qui tous ont œuvré pour que la phénoménologie use de ses lettres de noblesse dans le champ des littératures. Et ils le font dans le cadre d'une démarche interdisciplinaire car ils sollicitent les apports des neurosciences, de l'herméneutique, des arts tels la peinture, le cinéma ou encore la poésie, mais aussi les enjeux de réflexion éthique. Avec ce volume, riche par sa diversité et par sa portée interculturelle, ce sont en trois universités qui portent un projet rigoureusement collaboratif : l'UC Louvain de Louvain-la-Neuve, en Belgique, l'Universidad del Pacífico et la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú de Lima, au Pérou. Par conséquent, il est aussi évident que ces rapports entre phénoménologie et littérature se disent linguistiquement au carrefour des cultures francophone, hispanophone et aussi anglophone."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Dieses Buch bietet die erste systematische Diskussion von Husserls Cartesianischen Meditationen. Beginnend mit einem Kommentar zum Text der fünf Meditationen werden in den hier veröffentlichten Aufsätzen einige der wichtigsten Begriffe der Husserlschen Philosophie untersucht und geklärt: Intentionalität, Synthese, Evidenz, Intersubjektivität. Darüber hinaus bietet das Buch die erste Diskussion von Husserls später Version der Transzendentalphilosophie und ihrer Relevanz für zeitgenössische Debatten in der kontinentalen und analytischen Philosophie. Mit Beiträgen von Andreea Smaranda Aldea | Lilian Alweiss | Stefano Bancalari | Jakub Čapek (...) | Emanuela Carta | Daniele De Santis | Aurélien Djian | Saulius Geniusas | Sara Heinämaa | Leonard Ip | Hynek Janoušek | Federico Lijoi | Claudio Majolino | Danilo Manca | Sergio Pérez-Gatica | Witold Plotka | Alice Pugliese | Ignacio Quepons | Rosemary Rizo-Patrón de Lerner | Agustín Serrano de Haro | Wojciech Starzyński. (shrink)

CONTENTS: Walter Hopp: How to Think about Nonconceptual Content Jeff Yoshimi: Husserl on Psycho-Physical Laws Mark van Atten: Construction and Constitution in Mathematics Ronald Bruzina: Husserl's "Naturalism" and Genetic Phenomenology Andrea Staiti: Different Worlds and Tendency to Concordance: On Husserl's Phenomenology of Culture Rosemary R. P. Lerner : The Cartesian Meditations' Foundational Discourse: An Obsolete Project? Sebastian Luft: Lerner on Foundation, Person, and Rationality George Heffernan: The Phronimos, the Phainomena, and the Pragmata: Are We Responsible for the (...) Things that Appear to Us to Be Good for Us? Michael J. Sigrist: Husserl on God, Existence, and Transcendental Analysis Hans Pedersen: On Heidegger's Appropriation of Aristotle's Concept of Phronesis Ka-wing Leung: Heidegger on Animal and World Abraham Stone: On the Teaching of Virtue in Plato's Meno and the Nature of Philosophical Authority Michael Kelly: A Glimpse of Envy and its Intentional Structure Anne C. Ozar : The Value of a Phenomenology of the Emotions for Cultivating One's Own Character Review Essay Molly Brigid Flynn: The Agent of Truth: Reflections on Robert Sokolowski's Phenomenology of the Human Person (Noesis 2011). (shrink)

Rosemary Hennessy confronts some of the impasses in materialist feminist work on rethinking `woman' as a discursively constructed subject. She argues for a theory of discourse as ideology taking into account the work of Kristeva, Foucault and Laclau.

Pure time preference is a preference for something to come at one point in time rather than another merely because of when it occurs in time. In opposition to Sidgwick, Ramsey, Rawls, and Parfit we argue that it is not always irrational to be guided by pure time preferences. We argue that even if the mere difference of location in time is not a rational ground for a preference, time may nevertheless be a normatively neutral ground for a preference, and (...) this makes it plausible to claim that the preference is rationally permitted. (shrink)

In this survey of feminist theory, Rosemarie Tong provides coverage of the psychoanalytic, existential and postmodern schools of feminism. The author guides the reader through the complexities of even the most notoriously difficult thinkers. Students will meet and become familiar with many of the essential figures in the feminist tradition, from Wollstonecraft and Engel, on through de Beauvoir, Dinnerstein, and Daly, and up to Mitchell and Cixous. The text treats all views with respect and encourages students to think critically and (...) sympathetically about a wide range of views that have a direct relevance to their own lives. (shrink)

We investigate how the perceived uncertainty of a conditional affects a person's choice of conclusion. We use a novel procedure to introduce uncertainty by manipulating the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. In Experiment 1, we show first that subjects reduce their choice of valid conclusions when a conditional is followed by an additional premise that makes the major premise uncertain. In this we replicate Byrne. These subjects choose, instead, a qualified conclusion expressing uncertainty. If subjects are given (...) a third statement that qualifies the likelihood of the additional premise, then the uncertainty of the conclusions they choose is systematically related to the suggested uncertainty. Experiment 2 confirms these observations in problems that omit the additional premise and qualify the first premise directly. Experiment 3 shows that the qualifying statement also affects the perceived probability of the consequent given the antecedent of the conditional. Experiment 4 investigates the effect of suggested uncertainty on the fallacies and shows that increases in uncertainty reduce the number of certain conclusions that are chosen while affirming the consequent but have no effect on denying the antecedent. We discuss our results in terms of rule theories and mental models and conclude that the latter give the most natural account of our results. (shrink)

1. IntroductionA paternalistic act is one in which the protection or promotion of a subject's welfare is the primary reason for attempted or successful coercive interference with an action or state of that person. My aim in this paper is to determine the conditions under which such acts are Justified. The route I take is through the concept of consent, with actual consent providing the foundation for a rather complex condition which I claim is necessary and sufficient for the Justification (...) of paternalism.Because a paternalistic act apparently violates a subject's right to non-interference, it constitutes a problem in the general area of rights. Ideally, then, one should have a developed and convincing theory of rights — that is, a theory which contains an analysis of the concept of a right, and offers solutions to the central problems, e.g. who has rights and why, what considerations override prima facie rights, and how the relative importance of prima facie rights is determined — from which the solutions to various problems about paternalism can be derived. (shrink)

As human longevity increases, with people living well into their seventies and eighties, the need for long-term care for the elderly most certainly will grow. The longer people live, the more likely they fall prey to chronic disease(s), as well as to the standard toll the aging process takes on human bodies and psyches. In this article, I examine some of the concerns that a wide variety of governments, individuals, and families have expressed about meeting the long-term care needs of (...) large numbers of people over sixty-five. I then claim that each of these groups must do its share of long-term care for the elderly, depending on its ability to do so. Finally, I conclude that the more committed a country is to the deconstruction of ingrained notions about who should care (women) and who should work (men) (Belkin 2008), the more able it will be to meet the long-term care needs of the elderly and other vulnerable populations fairly. (shrink)

No other cluster of medical issues affects the genders as differently as those related to procreationcontraception, sterilization, abortion, artificial insemination, in-vitro fertilization, surrogate motherhood, and genetic screening. Rosemarie Tong s approach to feminist bioethics serves as a catalyst to bring together different feminist voices in hope of actually doing something to make gender equity a present reality rather than a mere future possibility.".

Four experiments investigated uncertainty about a premise in a deductive argument as a function of the expertise of the speaker and of the conversational context. The procedure mimicked everyday reasoning in that participants were not told that the premises were to be treated as certain. The results showed that the perceived likelihood of a conclusion was greater when the major or the minor premise was uttered by an expert rather than a novice (Experiment 1). The results also showed that uncertainty (...) about the conclusion was higher when the major premise was uttered by a novice and an alternative premise by an expert, compared to when the major premise was uttered by an expert and the alternative by a novice (Experiment 2). Similarly, the believability of a conclusion was considerably lower when the minor premise was uttered by a novice and denied by an expert, as opposed to when an expert uttered the minor premise and a novice denied it (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 showed that the nature of the uncertainty induced by a denial of the minor premise depended on whether or not the context was a conversation. These results pose difficult problems for current theories of reasoning, as current theories are based on the results of experiments in which the premises are treated as certain. Our discussion of the results emphasises the importance of pragmatics in reasoning, namely, the role of general knowledge about the world in assessing the probability of a premise uttered by an expert or a novice and the role of interpretations of the premise based on pragmatic inferences in revising these initial probabilities. (shrink)

Whether in the growing awareness of the origins of supermarket meat or the emergence of meat art, carnality appears to be something increasingly under question. Yet, despite meat carrying connotations that offer provocative connection with feminist concerns regarding the body, consumption and the cultural representation of women, meat consciousness has been only sporadically explored in existing feminist theory. Struck, however, by the comparisons between the dissected Body Worlds corpse and the filleted flesh of meat that are levelled most particularly at (...) female bodies on display, I examine in my article the bodily relations constructed in the Body Worlds exhibition by positioning the Body Worlds cadaver as a grotesque ‘meaty’ body under the broader rubric of the Bakhtinian carnivalesque. Within such webs of alimentary exchange, pleats of meaty matter may bring about localised eruptions of traditional and bodily engagements – including that of the gendered gaze – that entwine the possibility of pleasure, wonder and fascination into each act of inter-bodily engagement. Through this entrance into the very bowels of Body Worlds, my article ultimately asks what, as a feminist, it means to become meat conscious. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to examine Heidegger'sreading of Husserl in light of the theme of adaequatio, under which Husserl's assimilation into the history of the "metaphysics of presence" is often justified as having followed the steps leading from Plato to Hegel. This examination refers to sorne texts that hint at this contemporary gigantornachía which -although misunderstood by many- has influenced the 20th-Centuryreception of Husserl's work. Relying on sorne 1922/23 texts, the A. pointsout the Husserlian anticipation of the abandonment (...) of the ideal of adaequatioin transcendental phenomenology. Although Heidegger never acknowledged this anticipation, during his last 1973 seminar he did recognize Husserl's having provided him with the occasion to conceive the ontological difference and the ec-static concept of Dasein. (shrink)